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The general availability of government information is the foun-
dation upon which popular sovereignty and consent of the governed
rest. The founding fathers clearly recognized the importance of an
informed public to the maintenance of freedom.' Yet through most
of our history a government open to the people remained little more
than a hollow precept. Although it has been contended that the Con-
stitution grants a right of access to government meetings,' neither the
Constitution nor the common law expressly recognizes a legal right
of citizens to examine and investigate the affairs of government.'
The concept of a government open to the people, however sound
in theory, is not easily translated into a legal right. The right of the
public to know must be tempered by legitimate governmental inter-
ests in protecting the confidentiality of certain information. Thus it
is necessary to strike an often difficult balance between these compet-
ing claims. The desire of the public to gather information must be
satisfied with consideration for the way in which governments con-
duct their affairs and, therefore, an awareness of the practical limita-
tions that open government imposes.
The Ohio General Assembly, in enacting what is popularly
known as the "Sunshine Law,"4 has sought to formulate standards
by which to balance these competing interests. The statute has con-
ferred upon the public a broad and enforceable right of access to the
operation of governmental bodies. It has placed upon public officials
corresponding duties and restrictions of an exacting nature. The ri-
gors of the statute are exacerbated by the uncertainty of its applica-
tion. This article will attempt to explain the effect and operation of
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A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquir-
ing it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 MADISON WRITINGS 103 (G.
Hunt ed. 1900-1910).
2 See, e.g., Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under
the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1957); Note, Access to Official Information: A
Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952).
See H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 179-94 (1953).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1976).
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Ohio's open meeting statute and its impact upon Ohio's bodies of
state and local government.
1. FORMER LAW AND RECENT AMENDMENTS
Most states have adopted open meeting laws.' Although Ohio
has had an open meeting statute since 1953,1 it was quite limited in
scope prior to recent amendments. Under former law all meetings of
any board, commission, agency, or authority of the state or any of
its political subdivisions had to be open to the public at all times.
Specifically excepted from the requirement of openness were hearings
of the pardon and parole commission conducted at a penal institu-
tion.7 The law also provided that no formal action' of any kind could
be adopted at an executive session?
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held that the provisions
referring to executive sessions provided an exception to the general
I ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 393 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38-431.01 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-604 (Supp. 1973); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950-
60 (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-19-1 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § I-
21 (Supp. 1974-75); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.011 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 23-802 (1971);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-2 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 67-2342 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 5-14-1-4 (Bums 1974); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 28 A.2 (Supp. 1975-76); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 61.810 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:5 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 403
(1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 5 (Supp. 1975), art. 41, § 41 (1957), art. 23A, § 8 (Supp.
1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § I IA, ch. 34.9(0, ch. 39, §§ 23(A)-(C) (1973); MicH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 15.251-.253 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §471.705 (Supp. 1976); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 610.015 (Vernon Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1401 (1971); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 241.020, 244.080, 268.305 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2 (Supp. 1975); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:4-3 (Supp. 1975-76); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-17 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143-318.2 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 201-02
(Supp. 1975-76); ORE. REV. STAT. § 192.630 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 252 (1959);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.3 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-25-1 (1974); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(2) (Supp. 1975-76); UTAH CODE ANN. § 524-2 (1970); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-343 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 42.30.030 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.77 (Supp. 1975-76); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-
692.12 (Supp. 1975).
s Act of July 6, 1953, 125 Laws of Ohio 534.
Id.
The Ohio Supreme Court defined "formal action" as follows:
This means that at any session of a board or commission subject to the ordinance
or the statute, where any action is taken, which action is required by law, rule or
regulation to be recorded in the minutes, the journal or any other official record of
the board or commission, such session is a meeting which must be open to the public.
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3 Ohio St. 2d 191, 199, 209 N.E.2d 399 (1965).
1 The Trumbull County Court of Appeals has stated that "[ain executive session . . . is
.. .one from which the public is excluded and at which only such selected persons as the board
may invite are permitted to be present." Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 5 Ohio App. 2d 265,
215 N.E.2d 434 (syllabus) (Ct. App. 1966).
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requirement that all meetings of public bodies be open to the public.'0
Under this restrictive interpretation the statute permitted a public
body to conduct official business in executive session if its members
so desired and if the meeting did not involve the adoption or passage
of a resolution, rule, regulation, or other formal action. So inter-
preted, the statute lacked meaning and vitality, and represented little
more than a philosophical commitment to the principle of open gov-
ernment. Lively and full deliberation could be conducted behind
closed doors; as long as any formal action was taken, however per-
functorily, in an open meeting, the terms of the statute were satis-
fied."
Recent amendments to Ohio's open meeting statute have funda-
mentally changed the manner in which state and local governmental
bodies must conduct their affairs. 2 The obvious purpose of the
amendments is to afford all members of the public the maximum
opportunity, consistent with the protection of the public and of inno-
cent persons, to observe the full operation of government. With this
end in mind, the General Assembly has expressly stated that the
terms of the statute shall be liberally construed to require public
officials to take official action and conduct all deliberations upon
official business in open meetings. t3 Accordingly, any doubt that
may arise as to the application of the statute should be resolved in
favor of openness. t4
11 Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3 Ohio St. 2d 191, 209 N.E.2d 399
(1965).
11 Such a procedure is exemplified by a former practice of the City Council of Massillon,
Ohio. The meetings of council were described as opening
with a pledge of allegiance to the flag and then the members of the council [would]
retire for a caucus which . . . [was] closed to the press and public. After an hour or
two the members . . . [would] return to the public meeting room and vote approval
or rejection on the issues they [had] discussed behind closed doors.
Letter from Robert H. Giles, Executive Editor of the Akron Beacon Journal, to State Senator
David Headley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, February 19, 1975.
2 Am. Sub. S. B. 74, 11 th General Assembly (Eft. 11-28-1975).
2 OH'o REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
II The Ohio Supreme Court has recently indicated, in the case of Dayton Newspapers, Inc.
v. City of Dayton, 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 110, 341 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1976), that it will assume a
similar approach in favor of disclosing public records:
[D]oubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure of records held by governmental
units. Aside from the exceptions mentioned in R.C. 149.43, records should be avail-
able to the public unless the custodian of such records can show a legal prohibition
to disclosure. Cf. R.C. 121.22(A), as amended November 28, 1975.
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I. SCOPE OF THE SUNSHINE LAW
A. Public Bodies Governed by the Statute
1. The Terms of the Statute
The law requires that any meeting of a public body shall be open
to the public at all times.1 5 As applied to state government, a public
body is "any board, commission, committee or similar decision-
making body of a state agency, institution or authority ....
Thus the statute covers every facet of collective decision making by
a state entity. As under former law, however, meetings held between
an individual public officer and his staff or other individuals do not
fall within the scope of the statute.
Certain entities that would otherwise qualify as public bodies
under the statute are specifically excepted from its operation. The
exceptions appear to be based upon a determination that the business
conducted by these bodies is such that the interests served by main-
taining secrecy are more important than those promoted by inform-
ing the public. Thus the amended statute retains exceptions for grand
juries" and for certain meetings of the Adult Parole Authority.'8
Also, the Ohio Development Financing Commission, which assists
industrial, commercial, research, and distribution activities within the
state, may, by unanimous consent of all members present, hold a
closed meeting when considering certain information.'"
Although administrative bodies that perform an adjudicatory
function are included within the terms of the statute, the judiciary is
not. A court cannot properly be regarded as a "board, commission,
committee or similar decision-making body." Moreover, since most
judicial proceedings are open to the public, little would be achieved
by construing the statute to include the judiciary. Several state legis-
latures, in enacting similar statutes, 0 have specifically excepted the
judiciary from the openness requirement. The failure of the Ohio
General Assembly to do so, however, is not of particular significance.
No state legislature has included the judiciary within the scope of
open meeting legislation, and no court has interpreted one of these
statutes to include the judiciary. Thus it would be unreasonable to
read such a provision into the statute.
"5 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(C) (Page Supp. 1976).
1I Id. § 121.22(B)(1).
17 Id. § 121.22(D).
Is Id.
1" Id. § 121.22(E).
20 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-4(e) (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.30.030(I)(a) (1972).
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Neither is the General Assembly expressly covered by the terms
of the statute. Rules of statutory construction would prevent any
interpretation which would so extend it. It is significant that the
statute specifically applies to the "legislative authority . . . of any
county, township, municipal corporation, school district, or other
political subdivision or local public institution. 2 1 The fact that the
"legislative authority" is mentioned with respect to political subdivi-
sions indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to include
itself-the legislative authority of the state-within the definition of
a public body. Finally, the constitution of Ohio generally requires
that the proceedings of the legislature shall be open and further pro-
vides the circumstances under which they may be closed.22
Beyond these relatively clear examples, however, the scope of the
statute is extremely uncertain. Unlike some statutes that precisely
define the type of public body to be covered-e.g., bodies established
by law to serve a public purpose,2 or bodies which receive or expend
tax revenues24-the Ohio statute provides no general standard by
which to determine whether a particular entity is bound by the open-
ness requirement. The only guidance given by the General Assembly
is an enumeration of several broad types of public body each of which
is open to substantial interpretation.
The most intractable problem of coverage is whether the statute
applies to a governmental body's subordinate agencies or commit-
tees, the only function of which is to make recommendations to the
parent organization. Because the definition of "public body" is not
expressly limited to entities created by statute, it is quite possible for
the term to be interpreted as including such entities. The inclusion of
the term "committee" among the enumerated units would seem to
support the conclusion that advisory groups are subject to the provi-
sions of the statute. On the other hand, the phrase "or similar
decision-making body" casts this interpretation in some doubt.
In theory, the need to open the meetings of these advisory bodies
to the public is less compelling since their recommendations are nor-
mally considered in open session by the parent body. There are,
however, certain subordinate bodies which in fact, if not in law, do
far more than advise their parent bodies. Certain committees of state
universities, for instance, that are formally designated advisory
groups, often govern the university in effect. Surely it is not uncom-
mon for a university board of trustees, entrusted with the very com-
2! OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1976).
2' OHIO CONST. art. II, § 13.
2 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 92-2 (1968).
2' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Supp. 1975); LA. REv. STAT. § 42.5 (1965).
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plex task of governing a state institution, to routinely adopt the rec-
ommendations of a subcommittee with little or no deliberation. Al-
though such groups are not, in the strict sense, decision-making bod-
ies, they are certainly comprehended within the open meeting philoso-
phy.
Courts in jurisdictions having open meeting statutes similar to
Ohio's have held that subcommittees are subject to the same openness
requirements as their parent bodies. Thus it has been held that open
meeting statutes apply to meetings of a citizens' planning committee
which is appointed by a town council, 5 and to a committee comprised
of the dean and faculty of the law school of a state university" and
to all committee meetings of a state university board of trustees. 2
When a California court held that a city planning commission, the
only function of which was to make recommendations to city council,
did not fall within the scope of California's open meeting law, 2 the
statute was amended to include official advisory commissions. 2
The inclusion of such committees within the scope of the statute
would certainly seem to be in keeping with the spirit of the law. The
statute's introductory provision states that the section "shall be liber-
ally construed to require public officials to take official action and
to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meet-
ings."30 The scope of "deliberations" is much broader than the for-
mal act of decision making; and by this language the legislature
apparently intended to affect the entire decision-making process.
Committee meetings, at the very least, represent a stage in the
decision-making process. They can provide an easy means of com-
pletely circumventing the statutory coverage. One purpose of open
meeting laws is to "prevent at non-public meetings the crystallization
of secret decisions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance.3'
If the law is construed to except advisory committees, covert deliber-
ations followed by pro forma ratification might well become com-
monplace.
Yet a different aspect of the statute's introductory provision
might well have a limiting effect on the statute's application. Al-
though it has been stated that the word "officer" 32 is a term of vague
21 Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
21 Cathcart v. Andersen, 10 Wash. App. 429, 517 P.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1974).
21 Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975).
2 Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
2' CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54952.3 (Supp. 1975).
'8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
1t Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974).
32 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
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and variable import, the meaning of which may depend upon the
circumstances under which it is used,3 the term connotes certain
basic characteristics. Thus it has been held that a public office is a
charge or trust conferred by public authority for a public purpose,
with independent and continuing duties involving in their perform-
ance the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power. 4 This
definition would except many committees, most of which are com-
prised of public employees and private citizens, from the operation
of the statute.
On the other hand, the same language can be read to require that
a meeting of an advisory group be carried on publicly if it includes
among its members any public official. Thus a subcommittee which
is comprised of less than a majority of members of the parent body
along with other individuals would, on the basis of the introductory
provision, be subject to the requirement of openness. In at least one
jurisdiction, subcommittee meetings must be conducted in public if
the committee is composed of more than one member of the parent
group. 5
2. The Constitutional "Home-Rule Exception"
Another uncertainty in the scope of the open meeting statute is
the possible home-rule exception. Article XVIII, section 7 of the
Ohio constitution allows any municipality to frame, adopt, and
amend a charter for its government. This power is subject to article
XVIII, section 3 of the constitution, which provides:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in
conflict with general law.
In State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips36 the Supreme Court of Ohio
construed the words "as are not in conflict with general law" to
modify the phrase "local police, sanitary and other similar regula-
tions" but not to modify "powers of local self-government. ' 37 There-
fore, a state statute can override a municipal ordinance only in these
limited areas.
3 See State ex rel. Brand v. Eversman, 155 Ohio St. 383, 388, 99 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1951).
1 State ex rel. Herbert v. Ferguson, 142 Ohio St. 496, 501, 52 N.E.2d 980, 983 (1944);
State ex reL Bricker v. Gessner, 129 Ohio St. 290, 293-94, 195 N.E. 63, 65 (1935).
' Jones v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1970); Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1974).
4 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
Id. at 197, 151 N.E.2d at 727.
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In Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, s the su-
preme court decided that an open meeting ordinance passed by a
home-rule community was not a local police, sanitary, or other simi-
lar regulation." The court concluded that governmental bodies cre-
ated by a municipal charter or ordinance were governed by the local
open meeting law, while bodies created by state statute were governed
by the state regulations." Thus a charter community can adopt its
own ordinance to regulate open meetings of council and other public
bodies created by local law despite the Ohio open meeting law.
However, it is not likely that a home-rule community will adopt
an open meeting law less restrictive than the state statute. Growing
concern about the conduct of public business and abuses in govern-
ment will likely frustrate any attempt in the political area to shut the
doors to the public, except to the extent provided by the state law.
It is also possible that the courts will invalidate such ordinances
under the "state-wide concern doctrine."'" Under this doctrine, state
law may control even if the subject matter concerns local govern-
ment. If the "subject matter affects the general public of the state as
a whole more than it does the local inhabitants the matter passes
from what was a matter for local government to a matter of general
state interest. 42 The courts may reason that open meetings of public
bodies are of such great state interest, affecting citizens throughout
Ohio, that local legislation must give way to state law in this area.
B. Meetings and Executive Sessions
1. Meetings
The statute defines a meeting as any prearranged discussion of
public business by a majority of the members of a public body.4" The
definition is uncompromising in scope. Although chance encounters
among members of a public body do not fall within the ambit of the
statute, virtually every other form of discourse or interaction among
a majority of members could qualify as a meeting. Any social gather-
= 3 Ohio St. 2d 191, 209 N.E.2d 399 (1965).
I d. at 195, 209 N.E.2d at 402.
40 Id. at 196, 209 N.E.2d at 402.
41 See Cities & Villages, January 1976, at 15.
42 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 129, 239
N.E.2d 75, 78 (1968). Painesville involved intrastate and intercity transmission of high voltage
electricity. See also Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 337 N.E.2d 766 (1975) (doctrine
applied in the matter of fluoridation of a city's water supply); State ex rel. McElroy v. City of
Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962) (state-
wide concern doctrine applied with regard to safety regulations of water craft).
" OHflO REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
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ing or assemblage, no matter how informal or brief, could become a
meeting of the public body if it is prearranged and if it includes a
majority of members." Since official business is an inevitable topic
of conversation among public officials, full compliance will require
the constant exercise of self-restraint on their part.
Because any prearranged "discussion" could qualify as a meet-
ing, the definition extends to conversations by telephone or other
electronic equipment that are held simultaneously among members
of a public body. Since such discussions must be open to interested
individuals, the installation of speaker equipment may be necessary.
The statutory definition of a meeting may effectively extend
application of the open meeting law to some public bodies otherwise
beyond its scope. For instance, if a subcommittee or an advisory
group that is otherwise excluded from coverage includes a majority
of the members of a public body, its meetings will be considered
meetings of that public body and subject to the full requirement of
openness.
Certain entities subject to the open meeting law meet pursuant
to statutes which provide that they shall be in continuous session. 5
Although such provisions may affect the internal administration of
the public bodies in question, they should have no bearing upon oper-
ation of the open meeting law. Sessions formally designated as "con-
tinuous" should be regarded as a series of separate meetings and full
compliance with statutory notice provisions required in the case of
each such meeting.
One might question the wisdom of a statutory definition which
subjects such a broad range of human interaction to the full require-
ment of openness. A strong argument can be made that public offi-
cials should not be barred from discussing any aspect of public busi-
ness among themselves beyond the rigid confines of a formal open
meeting;" the consequent loss of freedom and spontaneity may im-
pair the ability of officials to efficiently dispose of public business.
The clarity of the definition, however, gives little countenance to
" But see State ex rel. Walsh v. Board of County Commissioners, No. 75-M-697 (C.P.
Geauga Cty. 1976). The court refused to accept the relator's argument that the commissioners'
"informal" conference with a state senator to discuss the creation of an additional common
pleas seat was within the definition of "meeting" in the open meeting statute. The commission-
ers had been attending a convention and had a "spur of the moment" meeting with their state
senator to discuss the issue. The court reasoned that the gathering was not prearranged and
therefore not covered by the statute.
15 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4120.10 (Page 1973); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
4703.11 (Page 1973).
" See Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REv.
451 (1975).
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considerations of efficiency. Public officials must, therefore, operate
under a constant awareness of the severe restrictions placed upon
them by the open meeting law.
2. The Definition of a Meeting and Freedom of Political
Association
Since Ohio's open meeting law applies to any prearranged dis-
cussion of public business by a majority of the members of a public
body," prearranged political caucuses of the majority party of a pub-
lic body must be open to the public. 8 This requirement may violate
the United States Constitution. Membership in a political party is
generally protected by the constitutional right of freedom of associa-
tion,49 an "inseparable aspect of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces freedom of
speech."8" This right includes the freedom to associate with others for
the advancement of political ideas and beliefs .5 However, political
associations are subject to state regulations if a compelling state
interest can be shown. 52
A three step procedure has been suggested to determine the
constitutionality of state regulation of political associations.53 First,
it must be determined whether the state's interest in establishing the
regulation is legitimate.4 The purpose of the open meeting law-to
require that deliberations and decisions about public business be done
in public view-is clearly a legitimate interest, promoting honesty in
government and participation by the citizenry.
Second, if the interests of the state are legitimate, then it must
be decided "whether they are 'compelling' or 'substantial' when
weighed against the infringement of associational freedoms that they
cause. 5 5 In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,5 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the prohibition of all political activities by
federal civil service employees, finding that the federal government
Omiuo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
4' This would not apply to party caucuses of the Ohio General Assembly. See text accom-
panying notes 21-22 supra.
11 See Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National Political
Conventions, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 148, 157 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Freedom of
Association].
0 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
51 Id.




56 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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had a substantial interest in maintaining an "efficient" nonpartisan
bureaucracy in spite of the infringement on freedom of association.
As compared to the interests of the federal government in Mitchell,
it would seem that the state government has a greater interest in
opening the doors of government to the public.
The final question is whether the state's interests can be substan-
tially served by regulations which are less restrictive to the freedom
of political association.57 Under the Ohio law this freedom is in-
fringed only in a very limited manner: party caucuses are required to
be open only when the members make up the majority of a particular
public body, and come together at a prearranged time to discuss
public business. If such caucuses were not required to be open, the
right of political association would allow a majority of the members
of a public body, who happen to be members of the same political
party, to exercise their right of association to thwart the public's right
to know.
A bill introduced in the General Assembly in 1976 would specifi-
cally exempt political caucuses from the open meeting law. 8 The
result of Senate Bill 431 could be to effectively repeal the open meet-
ing law in relation to those legislative bodies to which it presently
applies. In caucus, the party members could discuss and decide an
issue, and then in the public meeting could merely formalize the
action taken in the caucus. Thus past abuses of the executive session
would reappear.
3. Executive Sessions
Even the most rigorous supporters of open meeting legislation
recognize the legitimate interest that a government may have in
maintaining the confidentiality of certain information. The prema-
ture disclosure of information concerning sensitive matters may sub-
stantially harm individuals and operate to the detriment of the public
welfare. In an attempt to reach a statutory equilibrium between the
public's desire for access and the government's need for secrecy,
Ohio's recently amended open meeting law authorizes executive ses-
sions in several well defined instances. 9 In addition to limiting the
matters that may be considered in executive sessions, the statute
provides that such a session may be held only at a regular or special
meeting; 0 thus an executive session does not suspend operation of
" See Note, Freedom of Association, supra note 49, at 158.
S.B. 431, 11 1th General Assembly (1976).
' Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G) (Page Supp. 1976).
"Id.
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otherwise applicable notice procedures. Moreover, the session is per-
missible only for the purpose of "considering" certain information.
All final action must be taken publicly.
Personnel and Licensing Matters-A public body may hold an
executive session to consider the appointment, employment, dis-
missal, discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of a public
employee or official." Also, an executive session may be held in order
to investigate charges or complaints against a public official, licensee,
or "regulated individual.""2 If, however, the individual against whom
the charges have been brought so requests, a public hearing will be
held.
As to licensees, an executive session may be held only in the
event of an investigation of charges or complaints. At one point the
bill provided for executive sessions for the "issuing, suspension or
termination of a license." 3 This clause was, however, deleted prior
to passage. Thus the consideration of information pertinent to the
issuance of a license must be carried on publicly.
The provision limits executive sessions to the investigation of
charges and complaints. The exception is not as broad as it may at
first impression appear. The term "investigation" normally means
the act of carrying on an inquiry.64 Accordingly, once the inquiry
ceases and deliberations begin, the meeting must be opened and re-
main so through final disposition.
The provision authorizing a "public hearing" at the request of
an individual against whom charges are brought is troublesome. A
hearing generally denotes a proceeding of relative formality that
progresses in much the same manner as a trial. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the General Assembly intended to create a right to a hear-
ing that does not otherwise exist. It would be unreasonable to con-
strue such an oblique reference in an amendment to the open meeting
law as conferring a new and important right. A public meeting held
at the request of the individual would, presumably, constitute a public
hearing for purposes of the open meeting law.
The Purchase of Property-The disclosure of certain informa-
tion considered by a public body would give an unfair competitive or
I Id. § 121.22(G)(1).
62 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1976) provides:
"Regulated individual" means: (a) Any student in a state or local public educational
institution; (b) Any person who is, voluntarily or involuntarily, an inmate, patient,
or resident of a state or local institution because of criminal behavior, mental illness
or retardation, disease, disability, age, or other condition requiring custodial care.
House Journal, July 23, 1975, at 1623.
84 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 960 (4th ed. 1957).
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bargaining advantage to one whose private interest is adverse to that
of the general public. A public body is authorized under such circum-
stances to consider the purchase of property for public purposes or
the sale of property by competitive bidding in executive session.15
Although this provision was probably enacted with real estate
transactions in mind, it extends to personal property and intangibles
as well. Thus the provision would allow a body such as the Retire-
ment Board of the Public Employees Retirement System to meet in
executive session for the purpose of reviewing its proposed investment
program for the following month.
The term "property" is' commonly used to denote everything
which has an exchangeable value. 6 It is arguable that a lease, which
has been defined as the purchase of an interest in real property, 7 may
be considered in executive session. But while the concept is quite
broad, it is unlikely that it includes services of any sort. The consider-
ation of consulting contracts, for instance, probably must be carried
on in public.
The statute further provides that any purchase or sale of public
property is void if the seller or buyer of the property received from a
member covert information that was not disclosed to the general
public in time for other prospective buyers and sellers to prepare and
submit offers.68 Since such a purchase or sale would be void, the
transaction could be set aside in a court action against the public
body. The statute does, however, protect subsequent bona fide pur-
chasers, lessees, or transferees who pay for an interest in the property
without knowledge of the facts that make the title to the property
defective. If the minutes of the public body show that all meetings
and deliberations relating to the transaction comply with the provi-
sions of the statute, any instrument executed by the public body
disposing of property to a bona fide purchaser is conclusively pre-
sumed to have been executed in compliance with the provisions of the
open meeting statute. 69
Attorney-Client Conferences-An executive session is author-
ized for a public body to confer with its attorney "concerning disputes
involving such public body that are the subject of pending or immi-
nent court action."70 An action is generally considered pending from
its inception until rendition of final judgment. 71 "Imminent" denotes
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
" Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 247 F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917).
Minneker v. Gardiner, 47 Ohio App. 203, 191 N.E. 793 (Ct. App. 1933).
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
'5 Id.
0' Id. § 121.22(0)(3).
", See Ex parte Craig, 274 F. 177, 187 (2d Cir. 1921).
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something that is at the point of, rather than in the process of occur-
ring, something that is mediate rather than immediate. 2 It is appar-
ent that dictionary definitions of the term are unable to provide a
workable standard to apply in determining whether an executive ses-
sion is proper; the propriety of such a session must be left largely to
the discretion of the attorney. Although it is probable that the provi-
sion authorizes an executive session at the point at which litigation
is actually contemplated, the question is one that must be resolved
case by case.
Communications between an attorney and his client are nor-
mally privileged;73 however discussions in the presence of third par-
ties who are the agents of neither the attorney nor the client are
beyond the scope of the privilege. 74 Thus the General Assembly, in
limiting the circumstances in which such a discussion can be held in
executive session, has required a partial waiver of the privilege by the
client-public body.
Operation of this provision does not pose an ethical problem for
attorneys who deal with public agencies, because the privilege clearly
belongs to the client.75 But since there are certain professional duties
that are independent of the rights of clients, it is possible that an open
meeting statute could create an ethical dilemma for attorneys. A
Florida court has limited the operation of that state's open meeting
law76 by holding that an attorney has the right and duty to practice
his profession in the manner required by the Canon of Ethics, unfet-
tered by conflicting legislation which renders performance of his ethi-
cal duties impossible.77 In reaching this conclusion, the court per-
ceived a conflict between the statute and the canons as they relate to
confidentiality in the handling of pending or anticipated litigation.78
Although this precise situation could not arise under the Ohio statute,
the Florida case indicates a willingness by courts to defer to the
ethical duties of the legal profession when these duties conflict with
open meeting legislation.
The California Supreme Court has carved out a full exception
to the requirement of openness for consultations between a public
body and its attorney.7 Presented with the question of whether Cali-
72 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 884 (4th ed. 1957).
7 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1974).
7 See Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941).
7s See Knepper v. Knepper, 103 Ohio St. 529, 134 N.E. 476 (1921).
76 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (1975).
" Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1969).
76 Id. at 475.
n Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd., 263 Cal. 2d 41,69 Cal. Rptr.
480 (Ct. App. 1968).
OPEN MEETINGS
fornia's open meeting law"° abrogated by implication the statutory
policy assuring private legal consultation between a client and his
attorney, the court concluded that it was not the intent of the legisla-
ture to abolish this privilege."1 The Ohio statute, unlike California's,
specifically mentions and purposely limits the confidentiality of
attorney-client discourse; thus it is unlikely that the Ohio courts will
construe this provision to allow an executive session to consider infor-
mation that would otherwise be privileged.
Labor Relations- Meaningful collective bargaining could be
seriously hampered if each step of the negotiations had to be taken
publicly.12 For this reason, a public body is authorized to hold an
executive session in order to prepare for, conduct, or review negotia-
tions or bargaining sessions with public employees concerning their
compensation or other terms and conditions of their employment.3
The final decision to approve the terms and conditions of employ-
ment must, however, be made at a public meeting.
Confidentiality Required by Law-A public body may consider
in executive session matters that are "required to be kept confidential
by federal law or rules or state statutes."8 This provision prevents
public disclosure of records that must be kept confidential under
federal regulations, such as Medicaid files." It also prevents the open
discussion of information that is generally unavailable to the public
under the statutes of the state.8
Security Arrangements-An executive session is authorized to
consider the "specialized details of security arrangements where dis-
closure of the matters discussed might reveal information that could
be used for the purpose of committing, or avoiding prosecution for a
violation of the law."8 7 The term "specialized details of security ar-
rangements" is not defined. The apparent purpose of this provision
is to require general principles of public policy relating to crime
prevention to be discussed publicly while permitting consideration of
specific facts to be carried on behind closed doors if disclosure would
thwart the efforts of law enforcement officials.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54953 (West 1966).
" Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd., 263 Cal. 2d 41, 58, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 492 (Ct. App. 1968).
See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(4) (Page Supp. 1976).
Id. § 121.22(G)(5).
45 C.F.R. 205.50 (1975).
U See, e.g., Orno REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.57, 4732.19, 5119.87 (Page Supp. 1976).
" OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(6) (Page Supp. 1976).
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 497 (1976)
III. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
A meeting is open only in theory if the public has no knowledge
of the time and place at which it will be held. Accordingly, the open
meeting law requires that every public body shall establish, by rule,
a reasonable method of notice so that any person may determine the
time and place of all regularly scheduled meetings and the time,
place, and purpose of all special meetings.88
In the case of regular meetings, the precise method of notifica-
tion is left to the discretion of the public body. Such disparate means
as filing a notice with the Secretary of State, posting notice outside
the office of the body's executive secretary, or notification by mail
could be adopted to satisfy the notice requirements. Whatever
method of notification is chosen, however, it must be available to
everyone.
In the event of a "special meeting," which is any meeting not
regularly scheduled, the statute places additional duties upon a public
body. A member of the body is required, at least twenty-four hours
before such a meeting is held, to affirmatively notify interested news
media of the time, place, and purpose of the special meeting. 9 Emer-
gency situations are exempted from the requirement of twenty-four
hour notice. In the event of "an emergency requiring immediate offi-
cial action," someone must as soon as possible notify the interested
media of the time, place, and purpose of the meeting."0
The statute further provides that any person may, upon request
and the payment of a reasonable fee, obtain advance notification of
all meetings at which any specific type of public business is to be
discussed."' Advance notification may include, but is not limited to
mailing the agenda of meetings to all subscribers on a mailing list or
to all who have provided self-addressed, stamped envelopes. 2 Since
this advance notification provision applies to regular and special
meetings, it will be necessary for public bodies to plan their agenda
in advance. Although the statute does not expressly prohibit the con-
sideration of any new business at a meeting, it is clear that compli-
ance requires some sort of planning on the part of a public body.
Some of the notice provisions relating to special meetings may,
under certain circumstances, place an intolerable burden upon the
members of a public body. It seems unreasonable in an emergency






situation to require a public official to actually succeed in notifying
members of the media before commencing a meeting. The exigencies
of the situation may render repeated and varied efforts at notification
impossible. In such a case, a good faith effort to comply with the
provisions of the statute should be sufficient.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
A mere statutory declaration that meetings are to be held pub-
licly, without an effective means of enforcement, would do little to
ensure open government. Thus the law authorizes any person to bring
an action in a court of common pleas to enforce the provisions of the
open meeting law." Upon proof of an actual or threatened violation,
the court will issue an injunction to compel the members of the public
body to comply. 4 Injunctive relief is a rigorous means of enforce-
ment; moreover, there is absolutely no limitation with respect to
standing, and the injunction is not discretionary with the court.
The statute also provides for penalties against individual mem-
bers of a public body. Any member who knowingly violates an injunc-
tion may be removed from office in an action brought by the prose-
cuting attorney or the Attorney General. 5 Although the statute does
not specifically so provide, it is possible that an officer who violates
the open meeting law could be charged with dereliction of duty as
well.9" This offense is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable
by either imprisonment or fine, or both. 7
A far more wide-reaching provision is that calling for the invali-
dation of any resolution, rule, or formal action of any kind that is
not adopted in an open meeting." Even if the formal action is taken
in an open meeting, it is invalid if it "results from deliberations in a
meeting not open to the public."9 The statute does not define an open
meeting. Reported cases have, however, discussed the various indicia
of openness. One Ohio court has defined an "executive session" as
one at which the public is excluded; 0 by negative implication, this
court would define an open meeting as one at which the public is not
excluded, but is permitted to attend. That court noted that the test is
not who is present at the meeting of a governmental body, but
93 Id. § 121.22(H).
" Id.
'3 Id.
" OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.44(E) (Page Supp. 1976).
1Id.
9' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(H) (Page Supp. 1976).
" Id.
' Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 5 Ohio App. 2d 265, 268 (Ct. App. 1966).
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whether the meeting is open to those who wish to attend. 0' However,
another Ohio court has held that a meeting of a board of township
trustees that took place at the private residence of the township clerk,
without notice to anyone, was not an open meeting even though there
was no evidence that anyone was actually excluded. 0 2 The thrust of
the opinion is that one attribute of an open meeting is accessibility,
evidenced by its occurrence in a public place. This is in accord with
a decision of the Florida Supreme Court that a secret meeting occurs
when public officials meet at a time and place to avoid being seen or
heard by the public." 3 Thus the cases do not require a stated invita-
tion to the public; they do, however, require that no actions be taken
to exclude the public and that the meeting be held at a place and
under circumstances that indicate to the public that it is open.
Openness is not expressly contingent upon full compliance with
the public body's self-imposed notice procedure. Although a wanton
disregard for the statute's notice provisions would surely result in the
invalidation of official action, the effect of an agency's failure to
comply fully with its notice procedure is not clear. Courts have gener-
ally indicated a reluctance to vitiate otherwise legal actions on the
basis of technical defects, and have held in other contexts that sub-
stantial compliance with notice provisions is sufficient.0 4
Because so few states have open meeting statutes which contain
both notice and invalidation provisions, the effect of defective notice
in this context has rarely been the subject of litigation. The Supreme
Court of Iowa, in passing upon the validity of action taken at a
meeting of a board of education which the public was free to attend,
but for which no notice was given as required by statute, held that
the notice requirement was not jurisdictional and that failure to com-
ply would not result in invalidation. 15 Although the Iowa statute does
not provide for the invalidation of actions taken in violation thereof,
the case demonstrates the reluctance of courts to apply such a drastic
remedy in the absence of a clear legislative requirement to do so.
Because Ohio's open meeting statute does not expressly call for the
invalidation of action taken at a meeting for which notice require-
ments were not strictly followed, it seems highly unlikely that the
courts would construe the statute as requiring this result.0 6
101 Id.
102 Crist v. True, 39 Ohio App. 2d II (Ct. App. 1973).
' Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1971).
,o E.g., Jamison Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Rose, 14 Ohio App. 2d 47, 43 Ohio Op.
2d 136 (Ct. App. 1967); Nursing Homes v. Public Health Council, 113 Ohio App. 113 (Ct.
App. 1961).
'105 Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1970).
" See Lewis v. White, 287 N.C. 625, 216 S.E.2d 134 (1975).
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Perhaps the most fundamental ambiguity presented by the stat-
ute is the precise meaning of the term "invalid." The meaning of this
word often turns on the context, and courts have held it to mean both
void'07 and voidable."8 If the term means voidable, the action will be
invalidated as of the date of judgment; if it means void, the action is
invalid ab initio.
Courts in other states have voided a licensing tax ordinance'09
and a zoning determination t10 which were adopted in closed meetings
under older statutes that directed a specific body to meet publicly.
Another case"' held that a city council assessment for street improve-
ments would be null and void if considered at a meeting held in
violation of a general open meeting statute. The Florida Supreme
Court"' has stated unequivocally that a mere showing that its Sun-
shine Law had been violated constitutes an irreparable public injury,
and that an ordinance so adopted is void ab initio."3
Other provisions of Ohio's open meeting statute offer little guid-
ance about the meaning of "invalid." The fact that the statute simply
provides that formal action is invalid unless adopted at an open meet-
ing, rather than that such action may be declared invalid, indicates
that action taken in violation of the statute is void ab initio. Further-
more, the provision extending protection to bona fide purchasers of
public property"4 might be taken as an indication that all other action
taken in violation of the statute is void.
There are, however, considerations which support an interpreta-
tion of mere voidability. A void act usually denotes an inherent de-
fect, whereas an invalid act simply implies an absence of formality."5
Thus, the word "invalid" will ordinarily be interpreted to mean "ir-
regular" or "voidable," if there has been a failure to comply with
formal legal requirements."' It has been held that when a court ren-
ders a judgment on a matter over which it lacks jurisdiction, that
judgment is not voidable but completely void;" 7 but that if jurisdic-
"7 Kirkbridge v. Hickock, 155 Ohio St. 293, 302, 98 N.E.2d 815, 820 (1951).
"' Zimmerman v. Bank of America, 12 Cal. Rptr. 319, 320, 191 Cal. App. 2d 55, 57 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961); Johnson v. People, 202 III. 306, 66 N.E. 1081 (1903).
'" Lexington v. Davis, 310 Ky. 751, 221 S.W.2d 659 (1949).
it Blum v. Board of Zoning, I Misc. 2d 668, 149 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. Div. 1956).
" Hamrick v. Albertville, 219 Ala. 465, 474, 122 So. 448, 456 (1929).
"' Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
M Id. at 477.
... Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
"I See Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, 144 Misc. 534, 259 N.Y.S. 319 (App. Div.
1932).
II See Sturm v. Sturm, I I N.J. Eq. 579, 163 A. 5 (Ch. 1932).
" Lincoln Tavern v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956); Boyle v. Public
Adjustment & Constr. Co., 87 Ohio App. 264, 93 N.E.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1950).
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tion is proper, and some irregularity or mistake occurs, the judgment
is not void but merely voidable."8 None of the provisions contained
in the open meeting statute is expressly directed to the jurisdiction
of a public body; nor do the enabling statutes of public bodies ex-
pressly or implicitly provide that the power of a body is contingent
upon its full compliance with the open meeting statute. Since public
bodies have the inherent power to meet and conduct public business,
a statute providing for the manner in which such business is to be
conducted cannot be considered jurisdictional in nature.
In addition, the view that action taken in a closed meeting is void
ab initio poses formidable practical problems. The provision calling
for invalidation is mandatory once it is determined that action was
taken in a meeting closed to the public. A court is afforded no oppor-
tunity to consider the exigencies of a particular situation. The hard-
ship to those who detrimentally rely upon official action subsequently
voided is readily apparent, and is aggravated by the fact that the
statute contains no time limitation upon an action to challenge the
validity of an official act. It is possible, therefore, that action taken
in an illegally closed meeting could be relied upon for several years
before being declared void by a court.
This interpretation seems particularly untoward in light of the
fact that various judicial doctrines have been developed in other con-
texts to protect the public under similar circumstances. For instance,
it is clear that the acts of a de facto officer" 9 are valid, insofar as they
involve the interests of the public and of third persons, until his title
to the office is adjudged insufficient. 20 The rule was developed as a
matter of necessity to protect the interests of the public and individu-
als relying on the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an
officer, because it would be unreasonable to require the public to
inquire on all occasions into the title of an officer, or compel him to
show title.' 2'
If the term "invalid" is interpreted to mean void, members of
the public would have to determine whether or not a particular body
had acted in compliance with the open meeting law. They would, in
effect, have to rely upon the official actions of a public body at their
own risk. This interpretation will operate to the obvious detriment of
" Tipton v. Alvis, 87 Ohio App. 463, 92 N.E.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1949).
", "A de facto officer has been defined as one who, although not an officer in point of
law, has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and is accepted as such by those
who deal with him." State ex rel. Witten v. Ferguson, 148 Ohio St. 702, 708, 76 N.E.2d 886,
890 (1947).
"I See Stiess v. State, 103 Ohio St. 33, 132 N.E. 85 (1921).
121 See Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736 (1927).
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the public and is not justified by the policies served by enforcement
of the open meeting law.
V. CONCLUSION
The considerations that give rise to the enactment of open meet-
ing legislation are irrefutably sound, but many of the statutes are
drafted in a regrettable manner. The Ohio statute is seriously flawed
in that it fails to clearly define the public right of access and the
corresponding duties of public officials. Uncertainties that arise over
the basic issue of coverage are so fundamental and intractable that
their final resolution will undoubtedly require legislative revision. A
clear understanding of what is meant by the term public body is basic
to the effective operation of the statute; yet the language of the statute
offers little indication of what is comprehended within the term. The
statute is, therefore, open to interpretation and misapplication by the
public, government officials, and the courts.
Such ambiguities pose the greatest hardship to public officials.
Far from being a trap only for the unwary, the statute poses a formi-
dable problem to the most astutely circumspect public officials. The
difficulties raised by the statute's ambiguities are accentuated by the
harshness of the penalty for noncompliance, which is itself a subject
of considerable uncertainty.
The statute has undeniably provided members of the public with
a broad, if often controvertible right to observe the operation of state
government. However, it has also provided a source of confusion for
well-meaning public officials. It can only be hoped that the General
Assembly will soon attempt to resolve these difficulties.
